Ukraine belongs among those young countries where the beginnings of democratisation and nation-building approximately coincided. While the development of nation states in Central Europe was usually preceded by the development of nations, the biggest dilemma in the Ukraine is whether a nation-state programme -parallel to the aim of state-building -is able to bring unfinished nation-building to completion. Ukraine sways between the EU and Russia with enormous amplitude. The alternating orientation between the West and the East can be ascribed to superpower ambitions reaching beyond Ukraine. Eventually, internal and external determinants are intertwined and mutually interact with one another. The aim of the paper is to explain the dilemmas arising from identity problems behind the Ukraine's internal and external orientation.
Introduction
After achieving its independence, the Ukraine was standing at a crossroads. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the question arose: what kind of dynamics can be expected in the political, economic and social transition of this Eastern-European country? Will it be its Western or Eastern areas that take centre stage from a regional point of view? In the Ukraine, the dilemma of geopolitical orientation also emerged in terms of whether the state wanted to open up to the West or to the East.
In connection with all these factors, the country also had to cope with a special burden: the problem of nation-building. The existence or lack of a coherent national identity has a fundamental effect on the nature, quality and dynamics of transition and self-definition in the international space.
The aim of the paper is to explain the dilemmas arising from identity problems behind the internal and external orientation of the Ukraine. I argue that Ukrainian national self-identification is closely connected with the Ukrainian nation's differentiation from others and with its orientations, but the problem of Ukrainian nation-building is manifold:
1. The cultural ideas stemming from markedly different historical roots in the Eastern and Western parts of the country militate against each other.
2. The economic elite -taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the cultural cleavage -has an interest in perpetuating division in order to obtain/maintain state support.
3. There is no national concept in politics seeking to achieve national reconciliation and rise above differences in sight.
4. The myths on which the identities of the two opposing blocks are based are less crystallised, which has a conflict-mitigating effect.
To investigate these hypotheses, in the first part of the paper I will examine the historical predecessors of Ukrainian nation-building. Afterwards I will present the cultural aspects of nation-building. I will analyse the confronting cultural ideas and the economic and political causes of persistent diversity and discuss the conflict-mitigating effect of less pure identities in a separate subsection. In the second half of the paper I will focus on the Ukraine's endeavours in terms of international orientation with regard to the European Union and Russia.
Conceptional and methodological framework
I find it important to define the notion of nation-building, as several studies dealing with international politics fail to define the set of concepts they are working with and what they mean by nation-building.
When it comes to nation-building many experts analyse the problems of homogeneity, using the American terminology (theories and models of assimilation and modernisation), 1 whereby the main aim is to establish a common identity of different nations. Others are of the view that it must not be prescribed; instead, a coexistence of people must be organised despite their 1 In case of Daniel Lerner's model of communication and modernisation or Robert Park's theory of ethnic assimilation, the key to nation-building is a society of maximum homogeneity, which is defined by the number of shared features of different social groups. Both models find desirable the elimination of differences (arising from ethnicity, cognitive thinking and social manifestations) in order to establish a cohesive, productive, fair and rich society (Shah 2003). differences. In such a case the process of nation-building may entail the dissolution of old states and the emergence of new ones (Ottaway 2002).
Many experts do not differentiate between nation-building and state-building, whereas they only overlap in part and refer to different processes. The mixing of these notions can lead to serious confusion in interpretation. The process of re-building a state is considered nationbuilding by many (Talentino 2002) . By definition, the state is the totality of supreme public authorities and bodies; it possesses supreme power in a particular country, i.e. it is a territorial entity. Contrary to this, a nation is a constructed community whose identity is linked to a common historical area, culture, national economy and legal system.
In the paper I consider only the union by some kind of common link of different ethnic, religious and cultural groups as nation-building. In looking at Ukrainian nation-building I will analyse the strength and cognitive features of psychological relations existing within a society, i.e. the homogeneity of the social perspective. I will use the category system of Linz and Stepan (1996) to judge what chances Ukraine as a multinational state has of deepening democratisation and preserving its own territorial unity via its nation-building efforts. In their view, the more diverse a state is from the aspect of language, nationality, religion and culture, the more complex politics should be to lay the foundations for democracy. 2 They examine the 'interconnection' between the state, the nation(s) and democratisation. They form six categories based on the "degree of presence of other 'nations' besides the titular nation in the territory of the state".
After the first part of the paper I will also use the Linz -Stepan model to evaluate nationbuilding in Ukraine. I will seek an answer to where the Ukraine can be placed in the category system of Linz and Stepan based on the presence of different nationalities. Based on that we may find an answer to whether Ukraine is on the road towards solidifying a multinational state, or whether there is a realistic chance of territorial separation, an issue often covered by the media. Linz -Stepan (1996) .
Nation-building -A historical background
During democratic transition, societies are faced by the greatest challenges in those countries where the establishment of state institutions was not preceded by the process of nationbuilding (Dawisha -Parrott 1997) . In this case the majority society may have the opportunity to politically marginalise other nationalities in order to accelerate the development of common national identity. This problem often arises in the case of new states that are merged from several old states or formed by separation from an old state. In the Ukraine we can see both cases.
3 The political and cultural ideas and the foundations of identity-building existing in the Western and Eastern parts of the Ukraine are extremely different; furthermore, they slow down the dynamics of transition and hinder the crystallisation of orientations. Division has a number of dimensions, which can largely be attributed to historical grounds.
In his work entitled 'The Russian Empire from 1801 -1917 ', Watson (1967 After 1991 we also have to consider a so-called reidentification process: Soviet identity was replaced by a new Ukrainian identity, which was not a smooth process. The dominant Russian ethnicity became a national minority, a diaspora. While in a political, economic and geographical sense they are part of the Ukrainian nation, from an ethnic point of view they still consider themselves Russian. Yet in the past one and a half to two decades more and more people of Russian ethnicity have come to consider themselves as Ukrainian citizens.
However, parallel to the reidentification process the Russians' sense of insecurity and vulnerability has grown as well (Arbenina 2009 ).
Still, the ethnic type of division between the population of Russian and Ukrainian identity cannot be interpreted narrowly as a conflict between nationalities, because the former does not consider itself a minority. The problem of different identities observable in the Western and Eastern parts of the country cannot be resolved by using the concepts and solution options based on the paradigm of a minority-majority conflict.
The most remarkable examples of quasi-ethnic and cultural division are linguistic differences.
Before 1991, the Ukrainian language was discriminated, while Russian was favoured.
Although the situation has changed much since then, Russian continues to have a significant role in every area of communication, which the forces coming to power in the Orange
Revolution have not been able to change even in the past half decade.
In Ukraine, three large linguistic-ethnic groups co-exist: Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, 
The economic and political reasons for the perpetuation of cultural division
Ukrainian cultural division is also underpinned by economic interests. According to Tamás (2007) , two large and a marginal capitalist group can be distinguished, which follow significantly different strategies. The first one is composed of industry leaders, an EasternUkrainian oligarchy of Russian identity, who are interested in increasing exports and would like to achieve increasingly strong positions in the international markets. Their main export sector is metallurgy concentrated in the Eastern side of the country. The other major economic interest group is more interested in the commercial, financial and food industry sector connected with international capital. As for their identity, they are Ukrainians who -contrary to the first group -mainly support growth in imports. Their natural allies are foreign producers exporting to the Ukraine, multinational companies and the population with purchasing power to consume.
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These two main economic interest groups are extremely vulnerable because of their special industrial commitments. The global economic crisis reveals the weaknesses of the economic sphere to a large extent. 10 Although the above-described economic interest groups follow a diametrically different strategy, they are similar in one feature. Both seek to gain economic policy support from the state. Thus both interest groups support a political regime with a leftwing economic policy programme.
Before the global economic crisis, policy-making along a cultural faultline became the major identifying label for the alliance of parties presenting similar economic programmes. That is what brings us from the economic elite's economic value system basically independent of cultural rifts to the perpetuation of national identity debates in mainstream politics. The
Ukrainian nationalist political elite primarily supports interest groups interested in imports, while those involved in heavy industry are helped by the representatives of the EasternUkrainian Russian-speaking or simply Russian-identity political side. So cultural ideas and economic interests are reversed. The culturally right-wing political elite helps globalist economic interests, while the government -supporting the mostly Russian-speaking population and otherwise considered unpatriotic by the former -supports heavy industry, which is seen as a national economic mainstay, concentrated in the East.
The present Ukrainian elite therefore makes use of the existing cultural division to achieve their political goals, using it as a mobilising factor. In the referendum on independence held on the 1 st of December 1991, more than 90 per cent of participants voted for the complete independence of the country. The majority of the Eastern-Ukrainian population of Russian identity also voted for the independence of Ukraine (Sz. Bíró 2009) . This result was also seen as a positive development by the political elite of the time, because the Ukrainian legislature had already voted for the independence of Ukraine in August 1991. However, the national alternative was not united but emerged by two opposing opinions. Thus independence could not be coupled with unification.
Problems became perceptible right after 1991. In order 'to sell the new world abroad, culture was left to the care of previously half-or quarter-opposition literarians and philosophers from the countryside. Those people happened to be Galicians, i.e. they came from the NorthWestern part of the country and their programme was centred around the national language, and they were extremely impatient towards any other cultural programme' (Tamás 2007: 7) .
However, the Ukrainian national programme outlined this way was seen as strange by many, especially in the Eastern and Southern ends of the country.
From the mid-1990s, economic clans organised on a regional basis started to emerge, for example in the Doneck basin in the East and in the region of Dnepropetrovsk in the SouthEast. Regional attachments started to spread across the party system too. Business pervaded politics and the lack of advanced market institutions led to the concentration of assets in the hands of the few who had political ties. "Redistribution coalitions" (Olson 1965 ) and the processes of "state capture" (Hellman et al. 2000) were quick to emerge.
Thus the concentration of cultural and economic interests increased. By this time, obvious economic interests had been permeated by elements of national cultural identity. Cultural features became more important than belonging to the left wing or the right wing in the economic sense. The extreme social polarisation and ideological division also generated by (Fedinec 2007: 94) .
According to this view, the Orange Revolution turned out to be a cultural-ethnic revolution;
the factor of historical identity also played a key role in voter dividedness and its deepening.
The latter category was worked out by Lemberg-based sociologist Victoria Sereda and gives a kind of explanation of Ukraine's "East-West" divided (Sereda 2002) .
After the Orange Revolution, the victory of Western-oriented groups and radical nationals seemed to be potentially long-lasting but that did not come to pass. In February 2010, Viktor
Yanukovych won the second round of the Ukrainian presidential elections, thus ending the reign of the powers considered Western by many after the Orange Revolution. Although the contrasts arising from national identity seem to be calming down, this cannot be explained by the emergence of a unifying national idea but rather by the onset of the global economic crisis and the Orange Revolution's becoming a spent force.
The conflict-mitigating effect of less crystallised identities
While the foundation of most Central European states was preceded by the birth of nations, in the Ukraine the development of national consciousness is based on unfinished and extremely polarised ideas, which are also perpetuated by the prevailing political and economic elite of the day. These existing polarised identities are less crystallised.
The commitment of Western-type Ukrainian nationalism to the 'West' is not considered to be social status in independent Ukraine, too. In respect of higher-education degrees, they outnumber the Ukrainian population. Russian people living in the city earn higher wages, live in better equipped households and fill more managerial positions and are more highly qualified. Meanwhile, these differences have decreased since 1991; so there is no ethnic differentiation in this sense. On the whole, there is little prejudice against Russians and a high degree of acceptance between the two ethnicities even as a duality of ethnic self-awareness exists (Arbenina 2009 ). This seems to be guaranteed by the fact that there are very few people within the Russian-identity population who were raised in a purely Russian family; they mostly live in mixed families.
So-called Russification, or Russian cultural influence, did not cease to exist in Ukraine after it becoming independent in 1991; it remains an integral part of everyday life. In case of radio and television, Aza's research about media consumption pointed out that 61 per cent of the Russian population listen to news only in their mother tongue. Among Ukrainians this value is only 24.5 per cent. The survey has found that the ratio of Russian language in case of reading (newspapers and literature) is similarly high (Aza 2009 ). It can be concluded that the Ukrainian public is informed from the Ukrainian and the Russian media to a similar extent. In politics, business, education and daily conversations the Russian language is still dominant. It means that Russian continues to function as a kind of intermediary language in the country.
The category system of Linz and Stepan and Ukrainian nation-building
After the cultural aspects of nation-building I use the category system of Linz and Stepan (1996) to judge what chances Ukraine as a multinational state has of deepening democratisation and preserving its own territorial unity via its nation-building efforts. Linz and Stepan created 6 categories based on the degree of the presence of other nations besides the titular nation within the state territory (table 1). In the Ukraine there are other nations and major cultural and ethnic differentiations and cultural diversity. Thus the first category is by definition excluded. Of the nationalities to be found in the country at least two, the Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups, are far from vegetating and have sufficient cohesion and identity to be a nation-builder. Therefore categories number 3 and 6 can also be excluded. Ukraine is situated on the boundary of categories number 4 and 5. Although there are conflicts between ethnicities in case of category number 4 the establishment of democracy is not impossible, but in case of the significant lines of demarcation between the ethnicities, the possibility of peaceful separation also exists. By contrast, in case of category number 5 the stabilisation of democracy is almost impossible because of the high number of conflicts. Unless the conflicts have a well-defined territorial boundary, the tension remains continuous and democracy cannot be stabilised.
It is doubtful to what extent the self-conscious Russian and Ukrainian ethnicities considered
by many to be treated as fellow nations are 'awakened' or 'militant', or whether the possibility for these two communities to live together despite their differences exists. Another crucial issue shading the model of Linz and Stepan is whether Ukraine's 'Eastern' or 'Western' foreign political orientations become dominant. I think that the relevant question is not who Ukrainians consider themselves to be but how they feel about where and to whom they belong.
The geopolitical aspects of nation-building
In the history of Ukraine foreign policy factors have had an effect on both nation-building and state-building, which did not change much when the Cold War and the bipolar world order ended. In analysing the foreign policy aspects of Ukrainian national identity, the relevant question is not who Ukrainians consider themselves to be but how they feel about where and to whom they belong. 12 The choice of the Ukraine's foreign policy directions depends on many external factors and on the will of many uncircumventable geopolitical actors. From the West it is the ever expanding European Union, the United States and NATO, while from the East it is Russia, the regional superpower surviving the problems of the 1990s and still considering the republics of the former Soviet Union as parts of its sphere of interest, have an effect on Ukraine's orientation strivings.
The Ukraine's foreign policy motivations and changing orientation
Reaching independence in 1991 created the possibility of democratic transition and the development of a market economy, and thus political and economic integration towards the West for Ukraine. However, in the 1990s it became evident that Ukraine's efforts in state-and nation-building did not have as much momentum as it could be expected at the moment of seceding from the Soviet Union, and thus in its democratisation and switching to a market economy it also lagged well behind Central and Eastern European states. The Ukraine's political elite was continuously balancing between West and East, between the European Union and Russia.
The essence of this 'multivectoral' foreign policy, a term used by Ukrainians to describe it, is to extract the greatest possible commercial and economic advantage from the EU without having to start the radical transformation of the social and political system (with special regard to the network of political and business interest groups developed after reaching independence) and endangering the relationship with Russia.
During the second free election after becoming independent in 1991, Leonid Kuchma won the presidential elections with a Russian-friendly programme, counting on the votes of those being disappointed in the years after gaining independence, when the state was moving too far away from Russia. Before his re-election in 1999 'due to the internal political and economic problems becoming ever more serious and recurring corruption scandals he had also changed his foreign policy orientation: he had given up the pro-Russian course. He initiated a Western programme and won' (Sz. Bíró 2009: 10) . In the 1997 autumn session of the Ukrainian parliament, the Verhovna Rada, the detailed EU integration programme of the country was accepted. In June 1998, a presidential decree laid down the European integration strategy of the country, the major aim of which was full membership through associate membership.
But the scandals surrounding Kuchma did not diminish in his second term of office; on the contrary, they intensified. Meanwhile the goal of accession to the EU continued to exist.
According In the end, the presidential elections in February 2010 were won by Victor Yanukovych followed by Yulia Tymoshenko, which resulted in another change in direction. The new president now broke with the dominating Western orientation of the Orange forces and engaged in more balanced politics between the European Union and Russia. Ukraine now 13 According to Clement and Vincentz (2005) Ukraine's convergence will take 20 years in a best-case scenario, and at least 60 years in a worst-case scenario, as integration would generate far more disadvantages than benefits to an economically weak country. 14 At the January 2005 session of the European Council's Parliamentary Assembly, Viktor Yushchenko committed himself to the European integration of Ukraine, which also received a positive feedback from the EU. Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission welcomed 'Ukraine's return to the European family'.
tries to preserve its good relationships with Brussels while significantly opening up to Moscow politically and economically. 15 This is not a smooth process however. 
The West and Ukraine
Although the dialogue with the Ukraine has been continuous, the European Union and its member states have stimulated its endeavours for integration only at the level of declarations.
The former Western member states of the Soviet Union -except for the Baltic states -are important security policy factors for the European Union. Thus during the 1990s different kinds of aid was provided for economic and political stabilisation, democratisation, humanitarian affairs and -especially because of the experience with Chernobyl -nuclear safety.
The European Union considered the former socialist states to be candidates for membership, but this did not include the states of the former Soviet Union. A major reason for this was that the areas still largely depended on Moscow, belonged to its decisive sphere of interests, moreover they had not existed as sovereign and independent European countries before. The lag in nation-building and state-building also had a negative effect on democratisation.
Besides, in the 1990s Ukraine did not belong to the immediate neighbourhood of the then EU15. This problem was placed on the agenda during the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. At the 1999 Helsinki summit, a four-year Ukraine strategy was adopted, which urged a much more unified action by the member states of the Union towards the Eastern-European country, especially in the areas of economic transition, democratisation and home and justice cooperation. In case of the latter, we find mostly security policy considerations in the background.
In 
Russia and Ukraine
Russia has a major interest in keeping the countries of the CIS within its own sphere of interest or at least slowing down their moving away. This is not different in the case of Ukraine is seen by Russia as a key foreign policy actor from two aspects: (1) in a security policy sense, the country is still seen as a buffer zone separating Russia from the West; (2)
Ukraine is a significant export transit country for Russia towards the West.
A crucial element of Ukrainian-Russian relationships is the status of the Crimean Peninsula. Besides the problems of the Crimean Peninsula, the most critical policy issue of UkrainianRussian relationships is energy, especially the gas industry. The main task and aim of Russia's energy strategy is to secure demand and use revenues generated from ensuring supply for different political and/or economic aims. At the moment Europe is seen as Russia's main gas purchaser and this situation is expected to remain unchanged for a long time to come. Almost three quarters of Russian natural gas is sold in Europe (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2010). This means that the safety of gas trade to Europe is a fundamental interest of Russia, but this is also extremely true for the European Union in respect of imports.
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The European Union and Russia are separated from each other by a number of gatekeeper states, the most important of which being the Ukraine, considering that 80-85 per cent of the Russian gas export arrives to Europe flowing through the country. Due to this, the Ukraine is also an uncircumventable factor in the EU's gas import. Thus we can conclude that in the area of energy a number of EU member states, Moscow and Kiev depend on each other to a great extent. The recurring gas crises have shown the serious consequences of the fact that in the Ukraine the same gas-pricing system that is applied in the member states of the European Union did not function while trade took place through intermediary firms with obscure ownership. Although the treaty entering into force on 19 January 2009 seems to resolve both problems, whereby the parties have now switched to a quarterly settlement system similar to that of the member states of the EU and the intermediary role of RosUkrEnergo in gas trade will end, the debate can not be considered concluded at all. The parties most probably entered cent do not access to water, 90 per cent have no asphalt roads, 96 per cent have no gas installed and they do not have a sewer system, either. For more details see Sevel (2009) . 20 More details in Virág (2009). into an agreement which puts an extraordinary burden on the Ukrainian budget and economy, already facing a tough situation while transparency still leaves a lot to be desired.
Conclusion
Ukrainian identity-consciousness shows an Eastern-Western duality well-defined in space.
Cultural ideas originating from the past militate against one another. The situation is made complicated by the fact that the existing national myths show a less crystallised picture, and the political elite grown close to the economic elite also seems to be interested in the perpetuation of contrasts.
The Ukraine belongs to those young countries, where democratisation and nation-building started approximately at the same time. While in Central Europe the development of nation states was usually preceded by the development of nations, the biggest dilemma in the Ukraine is whether a nation state programme -parallel to the aim of state-building -is able to bring an unfinished nation-building to completion. The question is given: How can the two processes of democratisation and nation-building be aligned with each other? Ukraine fell into a serious trap from the point of view of nation-building since groups of different identitites living in the country and the elite protecting their own interests have diverging ideas about the way it should be done.
According to Linz and Stepan (1996) 'the greater the ratio of the people in a given territorial unit who feel they do not want to be members of the given territorial unit, the harder it will be to strengthen democracy within the unit.' Although many people see the possibility of a peaceful divide in Ukraine, it requires the existence of clear demarcation lines. Although the existence of an Eastern-Western division because of historical and ethnic reasons is clearly visible within the country, in the shorter term, other than further polarisation, we cannot expect the country to be divided into two parts due to the quasi-associate nature of Ukrainian and Russian-identity communities, their similarities and the economic interdependence of the two cultures, i. e. the inherent internal characteristics of the country.
Ukraine sways with enormous amplitude between the EU and Russia. The alternating orientation between the West and the East can be traced back to the superpower ambitions reaching beyond Ukraine. Eventually, internal and external determinants are intertwined and mutually interact with one another.
The Ukraine is still at the stage of putting its national interests into words. But the establishment of a well-described national interest system is hardly achievable without coherent a national identity. However, it means that beyond the occasional agreements emerging on the level of the economic and political elite we can find mostly clan interests rather than national goals. One of the most important factors behind what seems to be the prevailing political elite's unfledged geopolitical strategy and wavering diplomacy is precisely the uncertainty and lacking clarity about national interests and national identity.
Thus the fundamental international players have serious thematising power regarding the external orientation of Ukraine.
The most fundamental ones are the United States, the European Union and Russia. Among them recently Russia seems to be the most dominant, trying to bind Ukraine with direct political, economic, historical and information tools to itself. After the 2004 Orange
Revolution it managed to keep the Ukraine within its sphere of interest, i.e. by making use of the foreign policy division within the EU and the international involvement of the United
States.
Based on this it can be concluded that the four hypotheses determined in the introduction were verified. The cultural ideas stemming from markedly different historical roots in the Eastern and Western parts of Ukraine militate against each other. The economic elite -taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the cultural cleavage -has an interest in perpetuating division in order to obtain/maintain state support. There is no national concept in politics seeking to achieve national reconciliation and rise above differences in sight. The myths on which the identities of the two opposing blocks are based are less crystallised, which has a conflict-mitigating effect.
In my opinion, parallel to the economic crisis reaching Ukraine cultural conflicts will be gradually replaced by economy-related issues. Thus the problems relating to national identity will not be solved, but instead of internal orientations the presence of issues related to stability and security will increase, thus external orientations can become much more practiceoriented. It can be concluded that no civil war-like ethnic conflicts or any serious internal tensile tests will stem from the Ukraine's internal traits alone. The question remains however:
What will global politics do about the country?
